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Institutional Reform Litigation:
Representation in the Remedial Process
Federal courts today systematically reform institutions' in both the pub-
lic and private sectors to redress unlawful employment discrimination,2 to
improve prison conditions,3 to desegregate public schools,4 to reapportion
electoral districts,' and to remedy a host of other institutional wrongs.'
Because institutional structures and practices are complex, the formulation
of a remedy in a lawsuit seeking institutional reform often affects many
individuals and groups who are not among the original parties to the suit
and whose interests are not represented in the remedial process by one of
the original parties. Those persons and groups are frequently in a position
to provide the court with information critical to the formulation of an
effective decree and, if they are dissatisfied with the decree, to frustrate its
implementation. They should therefore be made parties to the remedial
1. Institutions whose practices and structures courts are commonly asked to reform, such as busi-
ness organizations, prisons, public schools, and various governmental entities and agencies, share sev-
eral characteristics. They each exist to promote an organizational goal, see K. AZUMI & J. HAGE,
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS 7 (1972) (defining characteristic is existence of organizational goal), are
the locus of the interaction of various persons, and possess an identifiable organizational structure, see
Scott, Organization Theory: An Overview and an Appraisal, in ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS: GENERAL
SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 99-100 (F. Baker ed. 1973) (defining character-
istic is system of structural interpersonal relations). But . J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS
1 (1958) (any definition is less than fully adequate because organizations exist as empirical phe-
nomonena that cannot be fitted into simple classifications).
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)
(rendering unlawful employment practices that discriminate on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin). The courts have remedied unlawful employment discrimination in both the public
and private sectors. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (private sector);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (private sector); Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975) (public sector), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976).
3. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-88 (1978) (prison conditions found to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1299-1322 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
4. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465-68 (1979) (systemwide school
desegregation appropriate relief for systemwide violation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-31 (1971) (busing of school children appropriate component of remedy to
school segregation); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) (segregated public
schools are unconstitutional), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown DI) (implementation order).
5. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1977) (court possesses broad powers to
reapportion state legislative districts to satisfy one man, one vote requirement); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (seats in state legislature must be apportioned based on population); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962) (adequacy of legislative apportionment is justiciable issue).
6. Several authors have discussed the emergence of institutional reform litigation and have identi-
fied many of its unique procedural needs. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (unlike traditional lawsuits involving disputes be-
tween private parties about private rights, institutional reform lawsuits attempt to vindicate constitu-
tional or statutory policies and consequently have unique procedural needs); Fiss, The Supreme Court
1978 Term Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2, 35-36 (1979) (bureaucratic
nature of institutions whose practices such suits seek to alter gives rise to peculiar procedural needs).
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process. This Note proposes that Rules 19' and 248 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure be amended to create mechanisms through which such
persons can routinely be joined and allowed to intervene in the remedial
phase of institutional litigation.
I. The Remedial Stage of Institutional Litigation
Courts fashion institutional remedies most effectively when all persons
who may be affected by those remedies participate as parties in the reme-
dial process. Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
provide for those persons' joinder or intervention.
A. Institutional Remedies
The task of formulating and implementing a remedy in traditional liti-
gation involves little complexity. A court ordinarily makes an injured
plaintiff whole by awarding him damages or by ordering the defendant
specifically to perform his obligations.9 The direct burden of each of those
remedies falls on the person or persons who injured the plaintiff.0 Fur-
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. This rule provides in relevant part for the joinder of persons who are
necessary to the resolution of a lawsuit. A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is required to be
joined if in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or if he claims
an interest in the subject matter of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may practically impair his ability to protect that interest or expose one of the parties to a risk
of double or inconsistent obligations. Id. See generally Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical
Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUMA. L. REV. 1254, 1256-62 (1961) (tracing evolution of
necessary parties doctrine from era of Lord Nottingham, Lord Chancellor of England from 1673 to
1682); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1-2), 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 483
(1957) (discussing modern evolution of necessary parties doctrine); Note, The Distorted Adversarial
Posture of Tide VII Affirmative Action Challenges, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (1980) (proposing
expansive application of Rule 19 in suits challenging affirmative action).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. This Rule provides in relevant part for the intervention of right of a person
who claims an interest in the transaction that is the subject of the action and who is so situated that
disposition of the action in his absence may practically impair his ability to protect that interest,
unless his interest is adequately represented by an existing party. The Rule provides for permissive
intervention of a person with a claim or defense that has a question of fact or law in common with the
main action. Id. See generally Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention
to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 (1979) (discussing need for expanded
intervention in suits challenging affirmative action); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968) (identifying factors that should
inform decision to let applicant intervene in suit that may affect his interests); Yeazell, Commen-
tary-Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244 (1977) (discussing one case in which state court allowed intervention of white
parents in remedial phase of school desegregation suit).
9. When fashioning relief, a court ordinarily chooses from a narrow range of remedial options the
one that will most effectively remedy the plaintiff's injury. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1282-83
("[T]he scope of the relief [in traditional litigation] is derived more or less logically from the substan-
tive violation under the general theory that the plaintiff will get compensation measured by the harm
caused by the defendant's breach of duty-in contract by giving plaintiff the money he would have
had absent the breach; in tort by paying the value of the damage caused.")
10. Plaintiffs in traditional litigation often assert claims against more than one defendant. When
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thermore, in most cases an extensive body of law guides the court's selec-
tion of a remedy and constrains its freedom to consider the indirect effects
potential remedies are likely to have on persons other than the parties."
There is therefore no reason for such persons to participate in the reme-
dial process.
Institutional reform litigation differs markedly from this paradigm.
Once a court determines that plaintiffs are entitled to institutional reform,
it must fashion an ad hoc remedy" that will effectively prevent future
injury to the plaintiff class and eliminate the current effects on that class
of the institution's illegal past practices.' 3 The selection and implementa-
tion of such an ad hoc remedy may affect a variety of people who depend
on the defendant institution for benefits, including its employees, investors,
customers, and other beneficiaries.'4
they do so, however, remedial burdens are imposed only on those defendants who are found to have
breached a duty to the plaintiff. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 313-14 (4th ed. 1971)
(only where "rough practical apportionment" of damages among defendants is not possible may each
defendant who has been cause of some damage suffered by plaintiff be held liable for entire loss).
11. In contract law, for example, a court is required to remedy a breach by awarding damages "if
damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1979). In determining the adequacy of damages, a court is di-
rected to look to the likelihood that damages could be collected and the difficulty of proving damages
and procuring a suitable substitute for performance. Id. § 360. Only if the adequacy of damages is
uncertain can the court proceed to consider such additional factors as the ambiguity of the terms of the
contract, id. § 362, the lack of security for performance, id. § 363, the likelihood that specific enforce-
ment would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate to
the advantages gained from enforcement, id. § 366, and the likelihood that specific performance would
cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach or to third persons, id. § 364. See id. § 359
comment a.
12. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (Title VII "implicitly recog-
nizes that there may be cases calling for one remedy but not another. . . these choices are, of course,
left in the first instance to the district courts"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)
(Brown II) (remedy formulation in school desegregation cases requires practical flexibility and facility
for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs in light of particular circumstances of each
school district).
13. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (in Title VII suit, district
court decree must "so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future"); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968) (applying
same standard to constitutional violations).
14. Institutional reform litigation may affect prospective employees, see, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (prospective job applicants bur-
dened by remedial hiring quota imposed in Title VII suit), current employees, see, e.g., Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) (current employees burdened in Title VII suit by
award of competitive seniority rights that determine preferential treatment at expense of other em-
ployees); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1305-08 (5th Cir. 1974) (prison guards' authority to disci-
pline prisoners reduced), owners, see, e.g., Marcus v. Putnam, 60 F.R.D. 441, 443 (D. Mass. 1973)
(certain shareholders allegedly burdened by consent decree that settled litigation against corporation),
customers, see, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135-36
(1967) (industrial purchaser of defendant's product affected by antitrust litigation that threatened
defendant's ability to market product at competitive rates); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (users of DDT affected by litigation seeking to ban its
use), and beneficiaries of the institution's mission, see, e.g., United States v. Perry County Bd. of
Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1978) (white children, parents, and teachers affected by school
desegregation); Dodson v. Salvitti, 77 F.R.D. 674, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (residents of area designated
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Remedies are selected through an adversary process in which each
party presents to the court the arguments and evidence best calculated to
protect its interests."5 The parties do not routinely present arguments and
evidence that reveal the disadvantages of remedies that impose burdens on
persons who may be affected by the decree but who are not themselves
parties. 6 Unless such persons are allowed to represent themselves in the
remedial process, a court may impose an excessive proportion of the reme-
dial burden on them. Perhaps more importantly, lacking the information
those persons could contribute, a court may choose a remedy that amelio-
rates the plaintiffs' injury less fully and efficiently than would other reme-
dial alternatives. 17 A court, having chosen a remedy ill-adapted to the
unique needs of an institution, may then need to supplement its decree
until an effective remedy is discovered through trial and error. 8 This
by court as site of remedial housing project affected by suit reforming practices of public housing
authority).
15. See O. FISS, THE CML RIGHTS INJUNCTION 30 (1978) (remedy formulation is "structured on
the contest model" of two parties vying against one another, with the judge as an impartial umpire);
Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1077-78 (1979) ("[Tjhe opposing
sides perceive themselves as competing for a favorable decision.") The process remains adversarial
regardless of the procedure the court uses to formulate the remedy. See Special Project, The Remedial
Process In Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 796-812 (1978) (identifying five
such procedures: remedial abstention, court imposition of remedy, court selection of remedy, master-
supervised remedy formulation, and negotiation of remedy).
16. A court frequently must decide which of several groups must bear the burden of remedying
plaintiffs' injury. In school desegregation litigation, for example, a court must decide how much of the
remedial burden it will place on the district's taxpayers by ordering the expenditure of monies to
upgrade facilities and bus students, on students from each of the areas within the district by ordering
them to be bused lengthy distances or to schools with facilities inferior to those of the schools they
previously attended, and on faculty and potential faculty by ordering faculty reassignments or impos-
ing hiring objectives. The school district's legal representatives can be expected to identify the disad-
vantages of any component of a remedial plan only when that component is less burdensome to those
who control the school district than the available alternatives. If plaintiffs are represented by profes-
sional group rights litigators, plaintiffs' counsel may fail to identify the disadvantages of certain reme-
dial components because to do so would undermine counsel's litigation objectives. See Special Project,
supra note 15, at 879. Plaintiffs may also fail to identify fully the hardships created by a potential
remedy because they have less incentive to be concerned with those hardships than do the people who
would bear them. In addition, the parties may choose not to bring the interests of non-parties to the
court's attention because the parties prefer not to dilute their control over remedy formulation or
desire to minimize litigation costs. See id. at 879-80.
17. Potentially affected non-parties are often aware of unique characteristics of the institution that
may impede the implementation of certain remedies, see Note, Implementation Problems in Institu-
tional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 440 (1977), including the means through which
they and other persons who interact with the institution may interfere with the implementation of
certain remedies. Id. (discussing Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), in which
teachers and school principals delayed implementation of due process standards relating to student
discipline). See Baker v. Clement, 247 F. Supp. 886, 896-97 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (intervenors success-
fully challenged defendant's proposed remedial plan, to which plaintiff had acceded). The court's
eventual remedy in the Baker litigation was based on the intervenors' proposals. Compare Baker v.
Ellington, 273 F. Supp. 174, 176-77 (M.D. Tenn. 1967) (remedy ultimately adopted) with Baker v.
Clement, 247 F. Supp. at 890 n.3 (remedy proposed by intervenors).
18. A court is under a duty to render an effective remedy in an institutional reform case. Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968). It may therefore need to revise a defective remedy
when "a better appreciation of the facts in light of experience indicates that the decree is not properly
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wastes judicial resources and denies plaintiffs the immediate relief to
which they are entitled.
A court can also implement the remedy it chooses with more efficiency
if all persons affected by the remedy are party to its selection. Persons
adversely affected by a remedial decree are likely to desire to protect their
interests and may therefore seek to avoid the decree's effects through ex-
-trajudicial means." They may disrupt a remedial order by violating its
terms2" or by taking action that, although not proscribed, is inconsistent
with the remedial regime contemplated by the court.21 If such persons are
parties to the litigation, a court can force them to cooperate in the rem-
edy's implementation by issuing orders directing them to comply with its
terms and by imposing sanctions on them if they refuse to do so. If they
are not parties, however, the court cannot easily issue such orders or im-
pose such sanctions because non-parties are not bound by the suit's resolu-
adapted to accomplishing its purposes." King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 418 F.2d 31, 35
(2d Cir. 1969).
19. If such persons are not made parties to the litigation, they may also seek to avoid the decree's
effects through collateral judicial proceedings. Non-parties cannot be bound by the res judicata and
collateral estoppel effects of a judgment unless they are in privity with a party to the suit. See Con-
sumers Union, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980) ("[A]
judgment cannot bind those who were not before the court either in person or through some sort of
representative.") Privity exists only if the interest of the person who is not a party is represented by
another who has been authorized to act as a party on his behalf or if the substantive legal right of the
person who is not a party stands or falls according to a judgment involving another who is a party to
the lawsuit. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 575-76 (2d ed. 1977).
For an instance in which an affected person achieved collateral relief, see Harmon v. San Diego
County, 477 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Cal. 1979). In that case, the county had successfully opposed plain-
tiff's motion to intervene in an earlier suit that had resulted in a consent decree, pursuant to which the
county agreed "not [to] discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or national origin in hiring. . . ." Id. at
1090. Acting in reliance on this decree, the county refused to hire plaintiff for a position for which the
county conceded he was the best qualified applicant. The court held that no party to the earlier
litigation had represented plaintiff's interest therein and that he was therefore not bound by the decree
entered in that litigation. Thus, the county could not assert its reliance on that decree as a valid
defense in plaintiff's current Title VII action. Id. at 1091-92.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1972) (black activist interfered
with school desegregation order); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 224-25 (D. Mass. 1975),
af'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976) (white students and parents violently
disrupted school desegregation plan).
21. The effectiveness of an institutional decree often depends on the voluntary cooperation of
persons affected by the decree. For example, the parents of white children may frustrate a school
desegregation order by withdrawing their children from the public school system or by moving, see
Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS 10, 13 (1978), white residents of a
neighborhood may frustrate the purpose of the construction of integrated public housing by fleeing the
neighborhood, see Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1135-37 (2d Cir. 1973)
(discussing "tipping point" phenomenon), or prison guards may frustrate the implementation of
prison reform by adopting informal procedures that reward those prisoners who cooperate in their
subversion of other prisoners' rights, see Sturm, The Rhode Island Prison Decree, in D. LOUISELL &
G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL 114 (4th
ed. 1979) (citing recalcitrance of prison guards as one of factors that rendered ineffective court-ordered
reform of Rhode Island prison system).
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tion.2   Instead, the court must either try to influence their behavior
through orders against the parties23 or join them as parties and allow
them to participate in the formulation of supplemental orders. 24 Facing
22. A court order "is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). See
Alemite Mfg. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930) (injunction validly runs against person not
party to lawsuit only insofar as he is legally identified with enjoined party or is prevented from
abetting enjoined party's violation of injunction). Similarly, a court can institute contempt proceedings
only against a person bound by an injunction.
[Only those acting in concert with, or aiding or abetting, a party can be held in contempt for
violating a court order. One whose interest is independent of that of a party and who is not
availed of as a mere device for circumventing a decree is not subject to such sanctions ....
The law exposes to summary punishment only those who have already had their rights adjudi-
cated in court.
Wright v. County School Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671, 677 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Accord Backo v. Local
281, 438 F.2d 176, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1970) (individual officers of union who were legally identified
with union that was subject to decree abetted violation of order and were subject to contempt), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); NLRB v. Sequoia Dist. Council of Carpenters, 568 F.2d 628, 633-34
(9th Cir. 1977) (same); Alemite Mfg. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[T]he only occasion
when a person not a party may be punished [for violating an injunction], is when he has
abet[ted] the defendant, or . . . [is] . . . legally identified with him.")
Because persons who may be affected by the choice of an institutional remedy are usually not
legally identified with the institutional defendant and are able to frustrate the implementation of a
remedy through action independent of the institution's actions, they cannot be bound by a decree or
held in contempt for its violation unless they are made parties to its formulation. The principal excep-
tion to this rule is the case of employees affected by a judgment against their employer. Even they,
however, cannot be bound in instances in which their legal rights are not derivative of those of their
employer, as, for example, in the case of employment discrimination litigation. Moreover, employees
who will be bound by a decree against their employer should be made parties because "it is middle-
level professional and managerial staff and lower-level operational staff who will be the actual imple-
menters of change." Note, supra note 17, at 440. Such persons are especially likely to possess informa-
tion necessary to the shaping of an effective decree. Id.
23. In Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982), for example, three white families attempted to avoid a
school desegregation decree by obtaining a state court order transferring custody of their daughters to
persons living in a part of the school district from which the girls would attend an all-white school.
The district judge, recognizing that the girls were not bound by its decree, coerced their compliance by
joining the state court judge to the litigation and enjoining him from interfering with the district
court's orders and from enforcing any of his own orders. The district judge also ordered school offi-
cials, over whom he had jurisdiction, to withold credit for the semester the girls attended the all-white
school if the girls chose to attend an all-white private academy instead of the integrated public school
to which they had been assigned. See id. at 934-36. The girls were therefore left with the option of
attending the integrated public school or repeating the semester for which their credit was denied. The
court of appeals ultimately concluded that the district court was without power to withold the girls'
academic credit if they chose to attend a private school. Id. at 944.
24. A court can make persons who were not bound by the original decree parties to a supplemen-
tal order that restricts their ability to frustrate the decree. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d
261, 268 (5th Cir. 1972) (private citizen ordered not to interfere with desegregation of schools);
Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (5th Cir.) (state governor ordered not to interfere in desegrega-
tion of Little Rock public schools), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92,
94 (6th Cir. 1957) (private citizen ordered not to make inflamatory speeches against school desegrega-
tion), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1957). Such orders, however, like an original remedial decree, can-
not bind the affected persons unless those persons are given the opportunity to participate as parties in
the formation of the supplemental order or the order is in the nature of a temporary restraining order.
See 0. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 628-29 (1972); United States v. Hall, supra, 472 F.2d at 267.
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this prospect, a court should join them at a time when it can impress them
with its good faith concern for their interests and when they can meaning-
fully contribute to the remedy's formulation.2 5
B. The Nonrepresentation of Affected Interests
Although individuals and groups who may be affected by the choice of
a remedy should participate in its formulation, the current provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for intervention26 and joinder27 do
not provide a mechanism through which they may be made parties to the
litigation. 2 Attempts to allow such persons to participate informally can-
not adequately address the courts' needs.
1. Intervention Under Rule 24
Rule 24 authorizes certain persons, whose interests may diverge from
those of the parties, to intervene in a lawsuit either as of right29 or permis-
sively.30 A few courts have interpreted this rule to allow intervention in
institutional reform litigation by persons who may be affected by the se-
lection of a remedy. 1 This practice, however, has not been common,32 in
25. Any other procedure
will tend to reduce the district courts to issuers of "'paper' decrees which neither adjudicate
nor, in\the end, protect rights." This is hardly a sound way to expend the energies of
overburdened district judges. Furthermore, plaintiffs will be frustrated by their failure to ob-
tain effective relief. . after lengthy litigation and the attendant inconvenience and expense.
Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm. v. Eldredge, 51 U.S.L.W.
3282, 3283 (October 6, 1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (concluding that employ-
ers who hire employees from pool of applicants referred by union are necessary parties in Title VII
suit against union because relief against union alone would not prevent employers from continuing to
discriminate among applicants).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. See supra note 8.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. See supra note 7.
28. Rule 23, which provides for the maintenance of class actions, cannot be used to join persons
who may be affected by the choice of a remedy but who are not parties to the litigation. This Rule
may be employed to certify a class and to ensure its adequate representation only after a class repre-
sentative has been made a party to the litigation. See English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d
43, 48 (5th Cir. 1972) (joinder of class effected in two steps: 1) joinder of representative of class under
Rule 19 as necessary party; 2) certification of class and its representative under Rule 23). Ctf Pan
Am. World Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[N]otice for
the purpose of bringing the claims of unnamed members of the plaintiff class before the court may not
issue before a class action has been certified.")
29. Intervention of right is available to a person who claims an interest relating to the subject
matter of a suit and who is so situated that the disposition of the suit in his absence may practically
impair his ability to protect that interest, unless his interest is adequately represented by a party. FED.
R. CIV. P. 24(a).
30. Permissive intervention is available to a person at the discretion of the court if he has a claim
or defense that raises a question of law or fact in common with the main action. FED. R. Clv. P.
24(b).
31. Some courts have allowed such intervention as of right. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1967) (intervention of right allowed in remedial
stage of antitrust suit by industrial purchaser of defendant's product who had interest in maintaining
competitive market); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 352-54 (9th Cir.
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part because the substantive law affords those persons no protection from
the adverse effects of institutional remedies. 3
Furthermore, persons with an interest in the choice of a remedy often
fail to attempt to intervene. Some are unaware that their interests are
threatened by litigation in which they are not represented. Others con-
clude that their participation would have little effect on the ultimate deci-
sion and, for that reason, choose to protect their interests in another fo-
1974) (intervention of right allowed in remedial stage of school desegregation suit by parents of chil-
dren of Chinese ancestry); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (intervention of
right allowed after judgment in school desegregation suit by parents of white children to enable them
to appeal remedial decree school board chose not to appeal).
Other courts have done so permissively. See, e.g., United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n
Steamfitters, 347 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (City of New York permitted to intervene in
Title VII suit against union where City had direct financial interest in decree and where City's plan
to increase minority representation in construction trade might be affected by resolution of case);
Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578, 580-81 (W.D. La. 1969) (black former elementary school
teachers permitted to intervene in school desegregation case).
32. Many courts have denied persons affected by the selection of a remedy the opportunity to
intervene of right. See, e.g., United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.
1978) ("[T]here are innumerable instances in which children, parents, and teachers may be deprived
of various 'rights' (e.g., the 'right' to attend a neighborhood school) without having had the opportu-
nity to participate directly in the judicial proceedings which divest them of those 'rights.' "); Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 520 F.2d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 1975) (white job applicants not
allowed to intervene in Title VII suit); Horton v. Lawrence County Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 735, 735-
36 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (representatives of black teachers not allowed to intervene in remedial
phase of school desegregation suit to protect interest of such teachers); Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229
F. Supp. 754, 798-99 (D. Conn.) (municipalities adversely affected by reapportionment decree not
allowed to intervene in legislative reapportionment suit), aff'd sub nom. Town of Franklin v. But-
terworth, 378 U.S. 562 (1964) (per curiam).
Many courts have also denied such persons the opportunity to intervene permissively. See, e.g.,
United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1978) (parents of white
children denied permission to intervene in school desegregation case); Horton v. Lawrence County Bd.
of Educ., 425 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (representative of black teachers denied
permission to intervene in school desegregation case); United States v. Carrols Dev. Corp., 454 F.
Supp. 1215, 1221 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant's lessor denied permission to intervene in antitrust
action where provisions of proposed remedy might adversely affect lessor's rights under lease); Marcus
v. Putnam, 60 F.R.D. 441, 443 (D. Mass. 1973) (shareholders of mutual fund denied permission to
intervene to challenge consent decree in derivative action).
33. Some courts have denied persons affected by the choice of a remedy the opportunity to inter-
vene because their interest is not "direct, substantial, and legally protectable." Diaz v. Southern Drill-
ing Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.) (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 24-27 (D.D.C.
1968), rev'd in part sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 878 (1970). See Dodson v. Salvitti, 77 F.R.D. 674, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (residents of area
designated by court to be site of remedial housing project lacked protectable interest sufficient to
permit intervention). But see Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[S]everal courts,
including this one, have, implicitly at least, rejected the notion that Rule 24(a)(2) requires 'a specific
legal or equitable interest.' ") Other courts have denied intervention for different reasons. See East
Powelton Concerned Residents v. United States Dep't of Health & Urban Dev., 69 F.R.D. 392, 392-
93 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (developer of urban renewal project denied permission to intervene because he
asserted no claims raising common legal or factual issues with those raised in suit to set aside urban
renewal plan although court recognized that its decision might affect developer's project). Some courts
have refused permission to intervene without giving any reasons. See United States v. Perry County
Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1978) (parents of white children denied permission to
intervene in school desegregation suit in one sentence order without evidentiary hearing or findings of
fact).
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rum34 or not to protect them at-all. In addition, groups that could litigate
as classes35 often fail to intervene because no member has a personal inter-
est sufficiently large for him to come forward on the group's behalf.36
2. Joinder of Non-Parties Under Rule 19
Affected persons who are not allowed or do not attempt to intervene at
the remedial stage of a lawsuit are rarely joined pursuant to Rule 19 in
part because their interests in the litigation are not "legally protectable" '"
and in part because courts have resisted the conclusion that the parties
cannot obtain complete relief unless such persons are joined." Courts have
34. Some potentially affected persons may desire to initiate a collateral judicial proceeding. In
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1979), afl'd, 447 U.S.
102 (1980), for example, Consumers Union had requested certain documents from the Consumer
Products Safety Commission. The Commission agreed to release the documents, prompting the corpo-
rations that had submitted the documents to commence litigation in the district of Delaware to block
their release. Consumers Union was not made a party to that suit, nor did it attempt to intervene,
choosing instead to initiate a separate suit in the District of Columbia, joining all of the plaintiffs in
the Delaware action and the Commission as defendants. Id. at 796.
Other potentially affected persons may prefer to protect their interests through extrajudicial means.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 225 (D. Mass. 1975) (members of white community
actively resisted school desegregation order), afi'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976).
35. A representative of a class may intervene pursuant to Rule 24 and seek certification to partici-
pate on the class' behalf pursuant to Rule 23. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 466
F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1972) (intervention of two black students in school desegregation suit condi-
tioned on determination that they are proper representatives of the class on whose behalf they seek to
intervene), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973).
36. This problem attends all litigation affecting classes of individuals. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). The problem is exacerbated here by the timeliness requirement of Rule 24:
a class can avoid the adverse effect of a remedy under consideration in a pending lawsuit only if a
class member volunteers to represent the class in timely fashion. See Note, The Timeliness Threat to
Intervention of Right, 89 YALE L. J. 586, 593 (1980) (timeliness is first requirement movant must
satisfy to intervene successfully). Cf Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1978) (motion
by prison guards to intervene in prison condition litigation filed three weeks after grant of preliminary
relief denied as untimely).
37. Rule 19(a)(2) provides that a person.who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction should be joined if he claims an interest relating to the subject
matter of the litigation and is so situated that the disposition of the suit in his absence may practically
impair his ability to protect that interest or expose one of the parties to a risk of double, multiple, or
inconsistent obligations. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2). The courts have uniformly invoked Rule 19(a)(2)
only where the "interest relating to the subject matter" of the litigation is an interest protectable
under the applicable substantive law. See, e.g., Smith v. B & 0 R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 583-84 (D.
Md. 1979) (employees who benefited from allegedly discriminatory job assignment procedure are not
necessary parties to suit seeking reform of procedure because they "would not be able to argue for the
inequity of declaring invalid an unlawful agreement"); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 416
F. Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (male participants in employer-funded pension plan not
necessary parties in suit by female employees challenging validity of certain provisions of plan); Hoots
v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 821-22 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (school districts with no legal right to
retain their present boundaries are not necessary parties to suit brought to change the boundaries of a
contiguous district), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
38. Rule 19(a)(1) provides that a person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction should be joined if in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1). A few courts have relied on this rule
to join persons who may be affected by a remedy and against whom the court expects to issue an
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also sometimes concluded that Rule 19 is inapplicable to suits whose ob-
ject is the vindication of public rights.3 9
3. Informal Participation
Judges and special masters" are ordinarily able to identify with little
difficulty the persons who should participate in the remedial process 4' and
order. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 251-52, 280 (6th Cir. 1973) (prior to implementing a
metropolitan school busing plan, each affected district must first be made a party to the litigation and
afforded an opportunity to be heard concerning remedy formulation but not the underlying liability of
the central city school system), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); df. Eldredge v.
Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 440 F. Supp. 506, 518-22
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (employers who hire employees from pool of applicants referred by union are neces-
sary parties in Title VII suit against union because relief against union alone would not prevent
employers from continuing to discriminate among referred applicants), rev'd, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3282 (October 6, 1982). Most courts, however, have resisted this
view, concluding instead that they can select and implement an effective remedy without joining those
who may be adversely affected by the decree. The court of appeals, for example, reversed the decision
in Eldredge, supra, concluding that it would be proper for the district court to order a change in the
union's referral practices without attempting to reduce the risk that the employers would respond to
the injunction in ways that perpetuate discriminatory hiring. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal.
Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
51 U.S.L.W. 3282 (October 6, 1982). See also Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632,
646 (N.D. I1. 1975) (complete relief can be accorded in suit seeking to limit expansion of operations
at city airport without participation of city); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 821 (W.D. Pa.
1973) (complete relief can be accorded in suit brought to change boundaries of school district without
participation of contiguous districts), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
884 (1974).
39. See, e.g., National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 363 (1940) (employees need not be
joined in suit by NLRB to enjoin enforcement by employer of illegal labor contracts); Kirkland v.
New York Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1975) (employees whose
advancement opportunities may be threatened by resolution of suit claiming employment discrimina-
tion not necessary parties), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); d. Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978) (applicants for coal leases not indispensable par-
ties to suit under National Environmental Policy Act brought to enjoin Secretary of Interior from
issuing such leases), afTd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Courts have also frequently resolved institutional reform lawsuits without addressing the argument
that potentially affected persons may be necessary parties. See, e.g., Local Union No. 35 v. Hartford,
625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980) (blacks not joined in challenge to affirmative action plan), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 917 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (prison guards not joined to suit
ordering sweeping prison reform).
40. Courts are empowered to refer matters to special masters in cases presenting special complex-
ity or other exceptional conditions. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b). Courts have frequently found such condi-
tions present in the remedial phase of institutional litigation. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 419 F. Supp.
1072, 1073 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (legislative reapportionment), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 407
(1977); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 227 (D. Mass. 1975) (school desegregation), atf'd,
530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549,
550 (E.D. La. 1972) (prison conditions). But see Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D.
Ala. 1971) (refusing request to appoint master in suit remedying inadequate conditions in mental
hospital).
Like judges, special masters acquire their knowledge about the defendant institution through formal
and informal means. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 767 (E.D.N.Y.)
(master ordered to receive and report evidence and "to consult informally with the parties and with
outside experts and others"), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), alTd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1975).
41. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1312 (judge's experiences on bench, relatively defined focus of
public law litigation, and local setting of many institutions enable court to identify such persons).
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sometimes invite those persons to participate informally. Unless the infor-
mal participants are given the procedural rights of parties, however, in-
cluding the opportunity to call and examine witnesses, to cross-examine
witnesses presented by the parties, to propose remedial alternatives, and to
discover evidence relevant to the selection of a remedy that no party wants
to introduce, this practice cannot fully satisfy the court's informational
needs42 or improve the court's ability to respond to attempts to frustrate
the implementation of its remedial decree.4 '
II. Amending the Rules: Standards for Remedial Joinder and
Intervention
In view of the inadequacy of other means of representation in the reme-
dial process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to
authorize the joinder and intervention of some persons who may be af-
fected by the remedy.44 The proposed amendment should establish alter-
native requirements for joinder or intervention of right at the remedial
42. Instead of giving non-parties these valuable procedural rights, judges and masters sometimes
attempt to satisfy the court's informational needs by interrogating the parties' and the court's own
witnesses and by meeting informally with interested non-parties. See, e.g., Amos v. Board of School
Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765, 823 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd sub nom. Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625
(7th Cir. 1976), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 767-68 (E.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974),
afi'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
Judges and masters should not substitute their own witness examinations for examinations by inter-
ested non-parties. Unlike judges and masters, such non-parties often have a unique knowledge of the
defendant institution, which they can bring to bear in examining witnesses. See Note, supra note 17,
at 440. Furthermore, a judge or master can effectively interrogate a witness only if the judge or
master has formulated tentative hypotheses about the proper choice of a remedy. See Damaska, Pres-
entation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1975); Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1042 (1975). Having formulated
such hypotheses, he is likely to question a witness only about the various remedial regimes that he has
hypothesized and may fail to inquire about matters that he has not anticipated. He may also discount
information that tends to disprove his hypotheses. See Damaska, supra, at 1092 (judge may "be more
receptive to information conforming to his hypotheses than to that which dashes with them").
Because of their unique perspective on the defendant institution, informal participants may also be
in the best position to propose an effective and efficient remedy. Cf supra note 17 (courts have some-
times implemented remedial plans proposed by intervenors). They should therefore be given the op-
portunity to propose remedial alternatives. Finally, as an adjunct to the right to examine witnesses
and propose remedial alternatives, informal participants should be given the opportunity to discover
information relevant to the selection of a remedy that the parties wish to suppress, see supra p. 1477
& n.16; otherwise their ability to contribute to the litigation will be limited by the extent of their
personal knowledge.
43. A court cannot bind affected persons to its decree unless it makes them parties to the litiga-
tion. See supra notes 19 & 22. Persons who participate in a litigation on an informal basis and
without any procedural rights are therefore not bound by the res judicata and collateral estoppel
effects of the court's order, see supra note 19, and cannot be subjected to summary contempt proceed-
ings, see supra note 22.
44. Persons who may be affected by the choice of a remedy but who lack an interest that is legally
protectable are not and should not be joined or allowed to intervene prior to the determination of




phase of a lawsuit:4" a person should be made a remedial party if his
participation will provide the court with information relevant to the choice
of a remedy that will not be presented by an existing party to the litiga-
tion 6 or if he is so situated that the court will require his cooperation to
implement an effective decree.
After a finding of liability in institutional litigation, a court should no-
tify persons who may be affected by the choice of a remedy of the court's
intention to reform the defendant institution's practices or structures and
should invite those persons to move to intervene." If the court then deter-
45. In keeping with the practice of the Rules to provide separately for joinder and intervention,
the proposed amendment should be incorporated into current Rules 19 and 24 and should make the
following changes:
I. Amend Rule 19(a) by inserting after the first sentence the following: "A person who may
be affected by the implementation of a remedial decree, who is subject to service of process,
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action after the determination of plaintiff's entitlement to relief
and before the grant of a remedy if (i) his participation will provide the court with information
relevant to the choice of a remedy that will not be presented by an existing party to the
litigation or (ii) he is so situated that the court will require his cooperation to implement an
effective decree."
2. Amend Rule 24(a) by inserting after the first sentence the following: "Upon timely applica-
tion anyone who may be affected by the implementation of a remedial decree shall be permit-
ted to intervene in an action after the determination of plaintiff's entitlement to relief and
before the grant of a remedy when (i) the applicant's participation will provide the court with
information relevant to the choice of a remedy that will not be presented by an existing party
to the litigation or (ii) he is so situated that the court will require his cooperation to implement
an effective decree."
The standards for joinder and intervention should be the same under the two rules because the
policy considerations necessitating the participation of potentially affected persons in the remedial
process apply with equal force regardless of the mechanism through which such persons are brought
into the litigation. See supra pp. 1477-80. Current Rules 19(a)(2)(i) and 24(a)(2) are similarly in-
tended to provide alternate methods through which interested persons meeting a single set of criteria
may be made parties. Rule 24(a)(2) "provides that an applicant is entitled to intervene in an action
when his position is comparable to that of a person under Rule 19(a)(2)(i), . . . unless his interest is
already adequately represented in the action by existing parties." FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory com-
mittee note.
46. This requirement is similar to the requirement under current Rules 19 and 24 that the absent
persons' interest be one that is not adequately represented by a party to the action. See Toney v.
White, 476 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1973) (Rule 19 implicitly requires inadequate representation as
condition of joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (explicitly requiring inadequate representation as condition
of intervention). Accordingly, a court implementing this test may look for guidance to the standard
that has developed under current Rules 19 and 24. That standard has been briefly summarized as
follows:
The most important factor in determining adequacy of representation is how the interest of the
absentee compares with the interests of the present parties. If the interest of the absentee is not
represented at all, or if all exisiting parties are adverse to him, then he is not adequately
represented. If his interest is identical to that of one of the present parties, or if there is a party
charged by law with representing his interest, then a compelling showing should be required to
demonstrate why this representation is not adequate. Finally, if his interest is similar to, but
not identical with, that of one of the parties, a discriminating judgment is required on the
circumstances of the particular case, but he ordinarily should be allowed to intervene unless it
is clear that the party will provide adequate representation for the absentee.
7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1909, at 524 (1972).
47. Such notice is analogous to the notice of litigation concerning the disposition of a fund re-
quired to be given to persons with an interest in that fund. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
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mines that a group of persons should be allowed to intervene and that the
group constitutes a class within the meaning of Rule 23, the court should
make some members of the group parties and should certify the group as
a class and those members as its representatives. 8 In so doing, the court
should select representatives who have no interests relating to remedy for-
mulation that conflict with those of other class members49 and should cre-
ate subclasses if there are certain issues common only to some members of
the class."0 Absent members of the class who have been given notice of the
litigation may be expected to help ensure the adequacy of their represen-
tation by advising the court if they think the class representatives will fail
to represent their interests adequately."
The court should also attempt to identify those potentially affected per-
sons who do not respond to its notice because they are pursuing a strategy
of non-participation or because they are members of an inchoate group of
which no member has sufficient incentive to step forward on the group's
behalf.5 2 The court should then initiate proceedings to determine if those
persons satisfy the criteria for remedial joinder.5 3
Joinder will often induce persons who are reluctant to become involved
to play an active role in the remedial process and to abide by the decree
that is implemented because it will foreclose all other means through
which they may protect their interests. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (notice of litigation concerning fund in which there are large
numbers of small interests "is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objections sustained
would inure to the benefit of all"). Notice may often be disseminated through the institution's normal
mechanisms for communicating with affected groups. In the case of an institution that operates in a
single geographic location, such notice may be supplemented by publication.
48. This procedure should conform to current practice under Rules 19, 23, and 24. See supra note
28.
49. A class may be certified only if "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This requirement has often been interpreted to
mean that the class representatives should have no relevant interests that conflict with those of the
class. See Guarantee Ins. Agency v. Mid-Continental Realty, 57 F.R.D. 555, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 251 (D. Minn. 1971).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630, 664
(1978) (discussing use of subdassing technique with respect to defendant classes).
51. Cf Note, supra note 50, at 645 (once given notice, absent persons can appraise more accu-
rately than court the likelihood that their proposed representative will be adequate).
52. Such persons will usually not intervene. See supra pp. 1481-82. The parties will also usually
fail to initiate proceedings to join such persons because those persons' interests are adverse to the
parties. See supra note 16 (remedial interests of plaintiffs and defendants are adverse to those of non-
parties who may bear part of remedial burden). Nevertheless, a court will ordinarily encounter little
difficulty identifying those absentees. See supra note 41 (discussing court's ability to identify such
persons).
53. Both trial and appellate courts have the power under current Rule 19 to raise on their own
initiative the issue of the joinder of a necessary or indispensable party. Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 798 (3d Cir. 1979), afl'd, 447 U.S. 102 (1980). This is a power, however,
that the courts have rarely exercised.
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will prevent them from bringing a collateral judicial proceeding." ' And
should the joined parties attempt through extrajudicial means to protect
their interests, they will be subject to a variety of court ordered sanctions
and supplemental orders.5
It is proper to use joinder, sanctions, and the consequences of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel to induce the participation of reluctant parties
who have interests that should be represented in remedy formulation. The
draftsmen of the current rules recognized that necessary joinder would fail
to protect the interests of the courts and the original parties if only per-
sons who agreed to be joined could be made parties. 6 Accordingly, current
practice under Rule 19 often requires the joinder of persons who oppose
their joinder and who, like those affected by the choice of a remedy, are
free of liability for the plaintiff's injury. 7 Although potentially affected
persons will often benefit from their participation as parties, the primary
purpose for their joinder is to protect the ability of the courts to fashion
effective and final decrees. 8 For this reason, they should be joined regard-
less of their wishes.
If an absent person chooses not to represent himself after joinder 9 or
cannot be joined," the court should formulate a remedy without his par-
54. See supra note 19 (affected persons are precluded from asserting their interests in collateral
proceeding only if they are made parties to litigation).
55. See supra pp. 1478-79 (discussing limitations on court-imposed sanctions against persons who
violate decree).
56. The draftsmen therefore provided in Rules 19(a)(1) and 19(a)(2)(ii) for the joinder of persons
in instances where joinder is in the interest of the court and the original parties, but not in the interest
of the joined persons.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1066 (10th Cir. 1974) (credi-
tor joined to suit adjudicating other creditor's rights to debtor's assets despite his desire not to partici-
pate); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440, 443 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (union that had expressly rejected invitation to intervene joined as necessary party in suit that
might affect union members' rights); Arey v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 11 F.R.D. 209, 209
(N.D. Ohio 1951) (exclusive licensee of patent who refused to join as plaintiff in patent infringement
action joined as necessary party).
58. See supra pp. 1477-80 (absence of potentially affected persons impairs ability of court to
fashion and implement effective and final decree).
59. An American court lacks any tools stronger than the threat of a default judgment with which
to coerce the participation of a reluctant party. See Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Proce-
dure, 18 ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1923). Cases will undoubtedly arise in which the threat of default is not
sufficient to induce an affected person or group to participate in the litigation.
60. A court cannot make a person a party if his participation would destroy the court's jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the litigation or, in the case of joinder under Rule 19, if he is not
amenable to service of process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee note. After a finding that a
necessary party cannot be joined, a court ordinarily proceeds to "determine whether in equity and
good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). The issue of the joinder
of necessary remedial parties is properly raised, however, only after a finding of liability in the action.
After such a finding, a court is under a duty to render a decree that will remedy the injuries of the
plaintiff class. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968). For this reason, equity and
good conscience can never compel the dismissal of a suit because a necessary remedial party cannot be
joined.
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ticipation. In so doing, the court should employ the techniques available to
it to, elicit, albeit imperfectly, his knowledge and concerns., 1 When possi-
ble, a court should also limit the scope of its decree to avoid its adverse
effects on persons who cannot be joined. 2
III. The Remedial Parties Procedure Applied: An Illustration
Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board63 is one of many lawsuits that
have attempted to integrate a racially segregated public school system."
The Valley litigation was commenced in 196565 and, after five years of
litigation, resulted in a determination that plaintiffs were entititled to a
remedy creating a unitary integrated school system.66 The district court
then entered a remedial order in which all parties to the litigation had
acquiesced.67 That order dealt primarily with pupil and teacher assign-
ments. In August, 1980, recognizing that its earlier decree had failed to
integrate the schools in Alexandria, a city within Rapides Parish, the dis-
trict court adopted a new remedial plan that, like its predecessor, dealt
primarily with pupil and teacher assignments. 8
61. See supra p. 1484 & n.42. Such techniques, though less than fully effective, do provide a court
with some information useful in the formulation of a remedy.
62. It will often be impossible so to limit a decree. The practices of an institution cannot ordina-
rily be modified for the benefit of one group without affecting the institution's practices with respect to
other groups.
Thus, the desegregation of schools frequently requires radical changes for white pupils, teach-
ers, and administrators. Jobs that are allocated to members of a group which has been the
victim of discrimination are necessarily denied to other groups. Funds that must be spent to
improve conditions in prisons or mental hospitals may be appropriated at the expense of other
legislative programs. A court-ordered housing project may depress property values in its
vicinity.
Special Project, supra note 15, at 906-07.
63. 499 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd in part, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982).
64. See supra note 4.
65. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 929 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982).
66. In response to the decision in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court held that freedom of choice plans are an ineffective means of remedying school segre-
gation, the court of appeals held in Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 422 F.2d 814 (5th Cir.
1970) (per curiam), that "effective immediately . . . school districts . . . may no longer operate a
dual system based on race or color, . . . they must begin immediately to operate as unitary school
systems within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color."
Id. at 815.
67. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 499 F. Supp. 490, 490 (W.D. La. 1980) (original
decree entered July 9, 1971), rev'd in part, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982).Three earlier decrees had been rejected by the court of
appeals. Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 434 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1970) (remedial plan relied on
neighborhood concept that failed to integrate schools in Alexandria, a city in Rapides Parish); Valley
v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 423 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (remedial plan that failed
to integrate 12 substantially all black schools obviously deficient); Valley v. Rapides Parish School
Bd., 422 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (same).
68. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 499 F. Supp. 490, 492-96 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
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In keeping with traditional practice, the only parties to the formulation
of each of the remedial decrees were the United States, the private plain-
tiffs, and the defendant school board.69 Under the system of remedial join-
der and intervention proposed in this Note, white families and the dis-
trict's teachers would also have been represented in the litigation.
White families are affected by the choice of a remedy in a variety of
ways."' The children may be assigned to schools with facilities inferior to
those of the schools they formerly attended.7 Their school days may be
extended by lengthy bus rides.7" In addition, unless adequate provision is
made for security within the schools, they may be exposed to racially mo-
tivated violence." White children and parents affected in these ways sat-
isfy each of the criteria for joinder or intervention. They are situated such
that they may be able to frustrate the court's decree. A child's enrollment
in a particular school will be determined jointly by court order and paren-
tal decisions to maintain or change the family's residence and to enroll the
child in a public or private school.7" A remedial decree can therefore be
effective only if it anticipates parental decisions and obtains parental coop-
eration.75 White parents are also able to contribute to the formulation of
an effective remedy by proposing ways in which a decree can minimize
white flight from the schools. By accomodating issues of concern to white
parents, such as the improvement or replacement of formerly black
schools,76 the court would be able to reduce white parents' incentive to
S. Ct. 1430 (1982). The court had previously made certain minor adjustments to the 1971 plan on
motion of the United States. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 930, modified,
653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982).
69. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 499 F. Supp. 490, 490-91 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd in
part, 646 F.2d 925, modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982).
70. Black families are of course similarly affected. Unlike white families, however, they have
always been represented in school desegregation litigation. In instances where the named plaintiffs are
unable to represent the interests of all black schoolchildren, courts already have the power under FED.
R. CIv. P. 23 to create plaintiff subclasses.
71. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-87 (1976) (discussing attempts in Boston, Detroit and Atlanta
school desegregation cases to improve formerly black schools).
72. The distances the court could have ordered students bused in Rapides Parish were considera-
ble. The modified decree actually implemented in 1980 called for the busing of certain students 15 to
20 miles. Battle of the Buckeye Three, TIME, Jan. 19, 1981, at 49; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971) (objection to busing may be valid when "time or distance
of travel is so great as to either risk the,health of the children or significantly impinge on the educa-
tional process").
73. Although the risk of violence in school integration should not be overemphasized, a court
ordering school desegregation must be prepared for its outbreak. Cf R. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 292-304 (1967) (discussing violence attending desegregation of New Orle-
ans public schools).
74. Coleman, supra note 21, at 13.
75. Id.
76. These issues apparently were neither raised by any of the litigants nor confronted by the court
in the Valley litigation, see Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 499 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. La. 1980),
rev'd in part, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
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withdraw their children from those schools.
The Valley litigation also sought to affect the hiring and assignment of
principals, teachers, teacher-aides, and other staff who work directly with
children." Reassignment disrupts a faculty's settled expectations. It may
also radically alter the nature of the jobs teachers and other staff members
are expected to perform. The court may limit the discretion normally en-
joyed by teachers and school administrators and may assign teachers ac-
customed to working with upper-middle class children to schools predomi-
nantly populated by black children from poor backgrounds. Those
teachers may lack the training and skills to meet the educational needs of
their new students. 8 Frustrated by reassignment, they may also lack the
desire to meet those needs. School faculty are therefore able to impair the
educational benefits that integration is thought to provide black and white
students. Teachers' unwillingness or inability to educate a pluralistic stu-
dent body may also accelerate white flight from the schools. If allowed to
participate in the formulation of a remedy, teachers may propose ways in
which a decree may avoid problems the parties choose not to address.
They may propose a decree that minimizes the disruption of their expec-
tations and that assigns faculty members to those schools in which their
talents may be put to best use. They may also convince the court of the
need to provide additional training to enable teachers to perform their
new functions. And, recognizing the educational needs of the various
populations of school children in the district, they may be able to propose
a system of student assignments that will achieve integration and that will
enable the schools to respond effectively to students' needs.
The failure to make such persons parties to remedy formulation may
have impaired the court's ability to integrate the Rapides Parish schools.
The court gave little attention to white flight" or the possibility of radical
1430 (1982); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 434 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1970), perhaps because the
school board wished to preserve its discretion and authority, and plaintiffs' counsel wished to promote
busing as the primary school desegregation remedy. Cf Special Project, supra note 15, at 885-86
(plaintiffs' counsel in school desegregation cases typically give less concern to relief designed to en-
hance educational opportunities of black children than to busing remedies).
77. The remedial decrees did in fact affect those practices. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School
Bd., 653 F.2d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 1981) (remanding for clarification of district court's 1970 order
governing faculty hiring and assignment as incorporated in the district court's 1980 order), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 313 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (W.D.
La. 1970) (ordering that "ratio of Negro to white teachers in each school and the ratio of other staff
in each, [be] substantially the same as each ratio is to the teachers and other staff, respectively, in the
entire system"), rev'd in part on other grounds, 434 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1970).
78. See Bell, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1829-31 (1979) (teachers in Portland, Ore-
gon, public school system rendered school integration painful and scarring experience for black stu-
dents due to their inability to cope with those students' needs).
79. The court approved attendance patterns for elementary school children with a view toward
minimizing white flight, Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 499 F. Supp. 490, 494 (W.D. La.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982), and successfully integrated the parish's elementary schools. See Valley
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remedial alternatives such as the closing or improvement of racially identi-
fiable schools or the retraining of school faculties.8" As a result, the Par-
ish's schools were somewhat less integrated after implementation of the
court's 1980 plan than the court had anticipated.' Indeed, of the 107
white seventh and eighth grade students reassigned from a suburban, all-
white school to the urban, racially mixed Jones Street School, only 22
actually enrolled. 2 The court's decree also failed to bind the white stu-
dents, giving rise to a highly publicized attempt by three families to trans-
fer custody of their daughters under order of a state court to persons living
in an area of the district in which children attended an all-white school.8"
The federal court was ultimately able to compel those students' attendance
at the integrated school to which they had been assigned,8' but not without
the expenditure of extensive judicial energy85 and the creation of substan-
tial public sentiment opposed to the implementation of reform. 6 The court
could have employed its time and energy more effectively had it joined the
white parents and children and the school faculty prior to the formulation
of a remedy, at which time their participation could have resulted in the
choice of a desegregation plan calculated to achieve integration in fact.
v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 932 n.3 (5th Cir.) (1980-81 enrollment figures for the
affected elementary schools substantially identical to the court's projected enrollment figures), modi-
fied, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430 (1982). The court gave less attention
to white flight from junior high schools and integrated those schools less successfully. See id. at 933
(attainment of projected enrollment figures for affected junior high schools "somewhat frustrated by
'white flight' ").
80. The court did close some predominantly white schools but dismissed in passing and appar-
ently without serious consideration the possibility of dosing the predominantly black Jones Street
School. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 499 F. Supp. 490, 494 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd in
part, 646 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430
(1982). The court did not address the possibility of improving school facilities or retraining school
faculty. Id.
81. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 932-33, nn.3-5 (5th Cir.) (comparing
projected and actual enrollment figures), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1430 (1982).
82. Battle of the Buckeye Three, TIME, Jan. 19, 1981, at 49.
83. See id.
84. In order to force the girls to attend their assigned school, the district court had to exercise its
authority over a state court judge and local school officials. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd.,
646 F.2d 925, 936 (5th Cir.), modified, 653 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1430
(1982); see also supra note 23 (describing efforts of district court to force girls to attend assigned
school).
85. The legal skirmishing over the fate of the three girls consumed an extensive portion of the
calendars of the federal district judge and the state court judge during the months of November, 1980
through January, 1981. See id. at 934-36 (describing extensive state and federal proceedings).
86. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, at A19, col. 1 (Ku Klux Klan and community group staged
demonstrations); c. Battle of the Buckeye Three, TIME, Jan. 19, 1981, at 49 ("For many local re-
sidents, the case has . . . provided a chance to vent frustrations over their inability to control the
schools as they see fit.")
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Conclusion
The provisions for necessary joinder and intervention were amended in
1966 to meet the changing needs of the judicial system. The emergence of
institutional reform litigation has created the need for yet another amend-
ment of the Rules. By requiring the participation in remedy formulation
of persons who may be affected by the choice of a remedy, the courts will
be able to fashion more effective and more final remedial decrees.
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